Topic Category: Trade & Finance

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was implemented on January 1, 1994. The purpose of the Agreement is to eliminate barriers to trade and investment—including tariff, import quotas, import licenses and investment restrictions—among the United States, Canada and Mexico so as to ultimately increase our standards of living. NAFTA has been hailed as a success by many. However, recent events have clouded its benefits.

NAFTA: A Success In Year One

During the first year of NAFTA, U.S.-Mexican bilateral trade rose 22%, up from $81.5 billion to $100 billion. U.S. exports to Mexico increased at about the same rate -- and almost four times faster than U.S. exports to the rest of the world.

Since NAFTA was implemented, there has been a proliferation of joint ventures and strategic alliances between U.S. and Mexican companies.

A survey conducted in May 1994 by KPMG/Peat Marwick, a leading consulting firm, revealed that nearly 40% of the 1000 respondents said their industry had already benefited from NAFTA. The American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico conducted a survey of its members in the Spring of 1994. Most respondents expressed confidence that NAFTA would be beneficial to their productivity and profitability.

Coopers and Lybrand, another leading consulting firm, interviewed executive officers of 410 of the fastest-growing U.S. product and service companies. According to the report issued, for growth companies, NAFTA has meant export opportunities, not job relocations.

NAFTA: The Second Year Will Be Poor

On December 20 of 1994, on the verge of entering the second year of NAFTA with flying colors, the situation drastically changed. An attempted currency adjustment by the Mexican Government that some say should have occurred earlier but at a more gradual pace, accelerated out of control.

The Mexican Government expanded its exchange rate band by 15% in an attempt to allow the peso to adjust downward. Within two days pressures mounted -- currency reserves used to prop up the peso were quickly dwindling. As a result, the peso was allowed to float freely. Shortly thereafter, it nose-dived.

From December 20, 1994, to July 1995, the peso dropped about 40% in value compared to the U.S. dollar. Like falling dominos, what began as a short-term liquidity crisis drove down confidence and sparked panic. The Mexican stock market dropped precipitously. Most investors whose money came due did not reinvest in the country. Prior to this, Mexican political events pressured the situation.

The assassinations of Luis Donaldo Colosio, the PRI presidential candidate, and Francisco Ruiz Massleu, a senior ranking PRI official, combined with unrest in the southern state of Chiapas, further fueled investor unrest.

U.S. exports of consumer goods, which include sporting goods, are expected to be most affected by the devaluation, according to David Hirschman, Director of Latin American Affairs of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Stated by Robert Hall, Vice President of Government Affairs at the National Retailers Federation based in Washington, D.C., Mexican retailers fear that the industry won't bounce back for years. Other retailers are not as pessimistic, but have delayed expansion plans pending how quickly the economy recovers.

JC Penny, Footlocker, Dillards (which operates 227 stores in the United States), Wal-Mart and Sax Fifth Avenue have delayed plans to open new stores.

President Clinton's announcement on January 31 to provide Mexico with about a $50 billion U.S./international package of loans and loan guarantees was met with considerable relief in the Mexican and U.S. business communities. Although economic indicators have fluctuated since then, greater stability and confidence in the economy has resulted.

On March 9th, Guillermo Ortiz, Mexico's Minister of Finance, announced an economic program designed to restore economic stability. The measures call for an increase in the national value-added tax from 10% to 15% and the elimination of some exemptions; reductions in government expenditures to 1.6% of GDP for fiscal year 1995; a rise of 35% in gasoline prices and 20% in electricity rates; a continuation of the floating exchange rate; and a 10% hike in the minimum wage (which was bumped to 12%).

As a result of the crisis and new austerity program, the Mexican Government anticipates a temporary increase in inflation of between 40% to 50% and a reduction in GDP of 2% to 3% this year.

NAFTA: Year Three Looks Bright

Earlier this year, Salomon Brothers projected Mexican GDP to rise by 3.4% next year. More recent estimates anticipate 3% -- indicating a short-lived crisis. These projections are partly based on strong anticipated exports -- which have already been registered. Lower inflation is also predicted for 1996.

According to a newly released 1995 Investment Climate Survey by the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico, planned capital investment by the 374 foreign and domestic firms in Mexico that responded to the survey will increase by 5.1% this year, from $5.9 billion in 1994 to $6.2 billion in 1995. Nearly 91% of all respondents indicated that long-term prospects for growth in Mexico are favorable. Of the American-owned companies surveyed, 95.4% expressed such confidence.

Exports of sporting goods (including games, toys and accessories) to Mexico increased almost 55% from 1993 to 1994. Exports to Mexico this year will be poor. However, as a result of renewed confidence and investment in the economy, Mexico's sporting goods and retail industry as a whole will slowly strengthen.

The Canadian Sporting Goods Market Improves

The Canadian economic recovery has positively affected its retail sporting goods market. Reportedly, Marcel Rousseau, co-owner of Sports Gilbert Rousseau, a Quebec City sporting goods chain specializing in hockey equipment, anticipates his sales figures to increase substantially over the next several years.

Paul Levine, a buyer for Sports Distributors of Canada, a 200-store chain based in Calgary, said his sales are on the rise. Levine believes that confidence in the economy has been restored and as a result, anticipates greater sales. The chain plans to expand into team sports, ski and cycling merchandise.

The Canadian sporting goods market is very receptive to U.S.-made sporting goods. From 1993 to 1994, U.S. exports of sporting goods there increased by 16%. As the Canadian economy grows stronger, U.S. exports will likely increase at a faster pace.

The Sporting Goods Market Is Growing in Chile, the Next NAFTA Partner

Chile, with a population of 14 million, is a growing market for sporting goods. The sector grew by 41% from 1991-1992, and by 47% from 1992-1993. Even though some specific subsectors such as bicycles and related products have increased by as much as 107% (1991-1992), the growth of the Chilean sporting goods market appears to have slowed to about 20%. Approximately 80% of sporting goods sold in Chile are imported.

Local production consists mainly of bicycles and related products, billiard and other game tables, and boats, motorboats, sailboats and yachts. Imports come mainly from Far East countries such as Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Malaysia, as well as from Europe. Many of these products incorporate U.S. technology and licensing rights. More recently, China and Japan are becoming significant competitors.

American sporting goods are regarded as being of excellent quality. U.S. market share has increased from 18% in 1991 to 20% in 1992, and to 23% in 1993. U.S. imports increased by 59% during the period 1991-1992 and 63% during the period 1992-1993. The Chileans are increasing interested in manufacturing locally under licensing agreements.

The market for sporting good products in Chile has grown steadily. This increase is fueled by a combination of factors, including improved economic conditions of consumers and a greater interest in health and fitness.

This article appeared in Sporting Goods Business, August 1995.
Topic: Trade & Finance
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Within the next ten years, we will likely see an expanded free trade agreement that will encompass the entire Western Hemisphere.

The goal to establish a free trade agreement of the Americas was agreed on by 34 Western Hemisphere leaders at the Summit of the Americas, held in Miami last December. With approval from Congress, U.S. businesses can look forward to greater opportunities and risks throughout Latin America.

The last decade has seen a period of remarkable economic reform and growth in the Americas. For the first time in history, Latin America, with a population of about 440 million, is now a community of democratic nations. The Summit of the Americas was dedicated to promoting this prosperity through open markets, hemispheric integration, and sustainable development.

Many Foresee Benefits

Many manufacturers see a real benefit. Frank Stucke, co-owner of Perfect Fit Glove Company in Buffalo, New York, agrees. "We've increased our exports to Mexico under Nafta, and through a free trade agreement of the Americas, we intend to gain greater market share in Latin America over our Asian competitors."

Perfect Fit has been manufacturing knit industrial and safety gloves for 21 years. Exports to Canada and Europe have been strong over the past five years. But sales to Latin America have increased the most, showing greater promise for the company.

Perfect Fit's success is on par with the experiences of many U.S. businesses. In fact, Latin America is the United States' second fastest growing export market, increasing at a high average annual rate of 14% since 1988. What's more, in 1994 U.S. exports to 20 Latin American countries increased by 16% from the previous year, achieving 2% above the average annual rate, reaching $88 billion. A free trade agreement that eliminates Latin American tariffs and non-tariff barriers will undoubtedly result in an even greater export performance by the United States.

According to a survey by KPMG Peat Marwick, an international consulting firm, U.S. direct investment in Latin America during the first quarter of this year totaled $1.9 billion. This represents an increase of 46% from the same period last year.

Many organizations and economists project solid growth in the region. According to a recently released survey from the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, El Salvador, and Trinidad and Tobago are expected to average 5% or more growth through 1996. The Association said that despite the Mexican economic crisis and its spillover effect on other Latin America countries, the region should remain attractive for foreign investors well into the future.

U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor says that by the year 2010 the United States will export more goods to Latin America than to Japan and Europe combined.

U.S. consumers will also benefit through lower prices on consumer goods here in the United States. The elimination of import duties on goods entering the United States from Latin America will result in many consumer goods becoming less expensive to purchase here. Retail prices on clothing are expected to decrease more than most other goods, according to Ralph Watkins of the U.S. International Trade Commission.

A Free Trade Agreement of the Americas Will Likely Boost Textile Exports South

Apparel production, which is labor intensive, difficult to automate and requires few skills, has continually moved to developing countries where labor rates are very low. Consequently, U.S. production has declined.

According to a U.S. International Trade Commission report released in January, the U.S. apparel production index declined from its base of 100 in 1987 to a low of 92.2 in 1990. It increased to 95.0 in 1992 before declining slightly in 1993 to 94.9. Over the last 10 years, U.S. imports of apparel grew by 90% to $34 billion.

This trend is not unique to the United States. Stated in the Commission report, from 1980-1993, apparel output decreased by 24% in developed countries but increased by 39% in developing countries. During this period, employment in this sector fell by 19% in developed countries and rose by 110% in developing countries.

The United States is one of the world’s largest and most efficient producers of textile mill products. However, over the years domestic output has also dropped. This is primarily due to a reduction in apparel production in the United States -- the single largest market for the textile industry. Thus, East Asian producers of apparel, major suppliers to the United States, source their textiles in East Asia, not in the United States.

In an attempt to sustain remaining domestic market share, U.S. apparel producers have expanded their production-sharing operations in Mexico and the Caribbean -- benefiting from the lower wages and tariff preferences. This activity also benefits the U.S. textile industry.

Macfarland Cates, president of Arkwright Mills and former president of the American Textile Manufacturing Institute, says that a under a free trade agreement of the Americas, more apparel production will move to Latin America as opposed to East Asia. Cates believes that U.S. textile mills will likely supply Latin apparel producers, where Asian producers will continue to source their textiles in Asia. This is good news for the industry, he says.

Importantly, a free trade agreement of the Americas will secure Latin American market share for U.S. firms vis-a-vis European and Asian firms.

Argentine Business Environment Positive

For the first time in more than a generation, the environment for American business in Argentina is positive. This is a result of a political decision by the Menem government to embark on a course of free market reform that includes fiscal responsibility, an open market, privatization and deregulation. A free trade agreement of the Americas will support and further strengthen these commitments.

The Menem government has reversed the isolationist, import substitution policies of the past half century. In only a few years, respectable growth and confidence in the future have been established. The country has achieved a high degree of economic and political stability.

With a population of 32.6 million, a per capita income of almost $9,000, and an annual growth rate of about 4.5%, Argentina has a great deal to offer the United States. Its consumers welcome American products and its business sector has increasingly become a firm commercial ally of the United States. Thus, last year the United States exported almost $4.5 in goods to Argentina, achieving an 18% increase over 1993, and a positive trade balance of $2.7 billion.

Mercosur, the regional trade bloc, includes Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina. NAFTA accession, or a bilateral trade agreement with the United States, which would precede a Western Hemisphere free trade agreement, is currently being debated in Argentina.

Colombia Has Undergone Dramatic Changes

The Colombian economy has been undergoing dramatic changes during the past several years as a result of the Government's new policy of aperatura or opening. Additionally, the Government has pursued a leadership position in forging free trade agreements in the region. Free trade agreements have been signed with Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile, and Mexico, while negotiations with others continue. Colombia has given notice to the United States that it wishes to become part of the North American Free Trade Agreement in the short-term -- in addition to becoming a member of a more powerful and influential trade agreement of the Americas in the long-term.

With a long history of democracy, sustained economic growth since the 1950's, and the aperatura process that is well underway, which includes the privatization of many state-owned enterprises, the Colombian economy will continue to grow well into the future. The economy, which registered a 3.5% GDP in 1993, increasing to 5.3% last year, is expected to grow at a rate of about 5% this year.

Since the Government implemented its liberal economic policies, Colombian imports have grown substantially. In 1994, Colombia imports from the United States reached almost $4.1 billion, a 25.8% increase over 1993. This represented approximately 36% of total Colombian imports.

Colombia, a major trading partner in Latin America, has demonstrated a preference for U.S. goods. While that country's image is often one of violence as a result of the illegal drug trade, it has achieved a very attractive investment and commercial climate. A trade agreement of the Americas will improve this.

The Venezuelan Market Will Provide Greater Opportunities

U.S.-Venezuelan trade is expected to grow substantially over the long term, despite declines of U.S. exports to Venezuela since 1992. In 1994, U.S. exports to Venezuela exceeded $4 billion, down from $5.4 billion in 1992. The U.S. has traditionally been Venezuela's most important trading partner, receiving about 57% of Venezuela's total exports and accounting for about 42% of its imports in 1993.

Venezuelan reforms begun in 1989 form a basis for movement away from a petroleum-based economy toward one that is diversified and market-driven. Tariffs fell sharply from a ceiling of 135% to a maximum of 20% (with some exceptions), and free exchange of currency was established. Driven by the reforms and economic expansion, imports grew rapidly during 1990, 1991 and 1992.

Since early 1992, Venezuela has endured a series of political and economic crises that have shaken business confidence within the country and have led to increased caution by international investors. Although new investments and marketing initiatives have suffered greatly since mid-1993, business efforts launched during the 1989-92 boom have largely continued to thrive.

In 1993, the Venezuelan economy went into recession. President Rafael Caldera suspended certain constitutional guarantees and decreed exchange and price controls on June 27, 1994. As the new currency control mechanism was being designed and put in place during July, foreign currency was generally not available to importers. As a result, orders from Venezuelan buyers slowed significantly.

This year will likely be difficult as the new Government deals with the struggling economy and policy challenges. Oil income, the main source of government funding, will probably not recover significantly from 1993 lows.

As the Venezuelan economy recovers from recession and low economic growth, imports from the United States will rise. A free trade agreement of the Americas will help to solidify Venezuelan economic liberalization policies, and will invariably secure Venezuelan market share for U.S. and other firms of the Western hemisphere.

This article appeared in Americas Textile International, June 1995.
Topic: Trade & Finance
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The U.S. Service Sector

The United States is one of the world's largest and most advanced exporters of services. Currently, the industry accounts for over half of the U.S. gross domestic product. In 1991, the United States exported $257 billion in services worldwide, and $8.3 billion to Mexico alone. Although Mexico has restricted trade in services, U.S. exports of services to Mexico have increased dramatically, more than doubling since 1987. This is a consequence of the United States' overwhelming competitive advantage in such a specialized and high value-added sector. For example, the U.S. telecommunications services industry is the largest and most competitive in the world, with revenues of over $90 billion in 1991, and a trade surplus of $1.9 billion.

New York City is the dominant producer of services in the United States and home to the largest firms in advertising, accounting, management consulting, engineering, diversified financial services, banking, securities and insurance. In the 1980s, corporate service firms became important export businesses and developed global expertise. The global economy has facilitated a boom in services trade due to the modern technology facilitation of long-distance interaction between the buyer and seller via electronic information flows and other modern telecommunications advances.

The Mexican Service Sector

The Mexican services industry is plagued by two problems that free trade and continued market liberalization will alleviate. First, Mexico's relatively small commercial and industrial sector has not created a large demand for a modern service sector. Mexico's highway system is so dilapidated that truck transportation can take 30 to 40% longer to go the same distance as in the U.S., with 60% higher fuel costs. As a result, the cost of services is significantly higher than in most industrialized nations. Second, extensive government regulation and mismanagement have created a service sector that is in need of modernization and improvements. The level of service that most Mexican entrepreneurs and managers are accustomed to is much lower in quality than would be acceptable in the U.S. This has been a particular disincentive for U.S. firms to do business in Mexico.

Service Rules of Origin and Nafta Provisions

Under the U.S.-Canada FTA, each country agreed to provide national treatment to those persons providing over 150 services. However, this obligation did not require that the treatment has to be the same in all respects. For example, if Canada chooses to treat providers of one service differently than does the United States, it is free to do so, as long as it does not discriminate between Canadians and Americans. In addition, a country may accord different treatment for legitimate purposes, such as consumer protection or safety, as long as the treatment is consistent. Under the U.S.-Canada FTA, regulations cannot be used as a disguised restriction on trade. For example, either government remains free to license and certify providers of a specific service, but must ensure that these requirements are applied consistently and do not discriminate against persons from the other country.

Nafta, in essence, does the same. The substance of the agreement requires each nation to treat the others' service firms no less favorably than its own. An important auxiliary rule incorporated into Nafta maintains that firms providing services cannot be required to establish a residence, office, branch, or subsidiary as a condition for providing a service. If the provider does wish to establish a tangible presence though, Nafta's rules will also prevent discrimination against that firm in the marketplace. Additionally, Nafta would extend this concept of national treatment to include provisions related to professional licensing and certification. The agreement explicitly forbids using such procedures to restrict trade or provide preferential treatment to nationals. Finally, Nafta does endow each country the right to deny benefits to firms which provide the service through a enterprise owned or controlled by a person or business of a non-Nafta country.

Nafta's Impact on the U.S. and Mexican Service Sector

Nafta will substantially add to current U.S. exports of services by further opening Mexico's $146 billion market in services. It levels the playing field, guaranteeing that U.S. service providers get the same treatment in Mexico as Mexican firms, and allows U.S. firms to provide services in Mexico without relocating their operations to Mexico.

The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement established the first comprehensive set of principles governing services trade. Nafta broadens these protections and extends them to Mexico. Canada has retained its cultural exclusion from the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Sectors covered under Nafta include: accounting, enhanced telecommunications, advertising, environmental services, architecture, health care management, broadcasting, land transport, commercial education, legal services, construction, publishing, consulting, tourism, and engineering.

According to the Congressional Budget Office, the major services that Nafta would open in Mexico include finance, business services, land transportation and telecommunications. Under Nafta, the licensing of professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, and accountants, will be based on competence, not nationality or residency. Citizenship requirements for licensing of professionals will be eliminated within two years.

Importantly, Nafta requires each country to provide for improved intellectual property protection and enforcement of the rights of inventors, authors, and artists against infringement and piracy, reducing the risk that products of U.S. creativity and innovation could be unfairly exploited in Mexico. By reducing the threat of piracy and other loss, Nafta provides additional incentives for U.S. providers to develop new technologies and products. Also, the Agreement ensures protection for North American producers of computer programs, sound recordings, motion pictures, encrypted satellite signals and other creations, including rental rights for computer programs and sound recordings. Increased protection against copyright/patent violation should lead to increased R&D spending by U.S. firms. This will undoubtedly enhance opportunities for U.S. service providers.

Although a comprehensive set of regulations modify the liberalization of trade and investment in the banking, investment, insurance, transportation, and telecommunications industries, these regulations only cover the transition period of liberalization. Afterwards, these industries will be as open to free trade and international competition as any other. For example, after 2000, Nafta would allow U.S. banks, securities and insurance firms, and other financial institutions to establish wholly-owned subsidiaries in Mexico. All current restrictions discriminating against foreign firms would be lifted for Nafta countries.

New U.S. entrants establishing joint ventures in Mexico will be allowed 100% ownership by 2000. Finally, reciprocal rights would be established for firms based in member nations. U.S. bank's share of the Mexican market is immediately expected to grow under Nafta, thus making the U.S. banking industry more internationally diversified and competitive. Financial institutions particularly stand to gain in the long run as they both finance further Mexican development, and finance and insure the growing volume of trade between the U.S. and Mexico. In insurance alone, industry experts calculate that Mexico could become one of the world's top ten insurance markets by the turn of the century. The liberalization of the financial sector is crucial to Mexico's further development because of the country's absolute necessity to institute a modern system of credit and securities markets.

The benefits to both countries extend to the transportation and telecommunications sectors, too. Since both are essential services for the furthering of business, they will grow exponentially as the volume of trade and investment increases between the Nafta countries. Under Nafta, both nations have agreed to allow reciprocal truck and bus access to the states and regions adjacent to the border by the end of 1995. By the year 2000, Nafta will eliminate restrictions on the U.S. trucking industry -- allowing U.S. rigs to deliver anywhere in Mexico. According the U.S. International Trade Commission, in 1990 two-way trade with Mexico in goods carried was approximately $65 billion, or about 37% of two-way trade with Canada. The International Trade Commission forecasts modest gains in the short run for U.S. trucking firms, with increased gains commensurate with increased trade.

The United States' overwhelming competitive advantage in telecommunications will allow it to gain the majority market share in advanced telecommunications services. In 1991 alone, U.S. exports to Mexico of telecommunications services registered a $30 million trade surplus. Providers of these services stand not only to gain from increased cross-border business with Mexico, but also from increased demand for advanced telecommunications services on the part of multinationals investing in Mexico. As a result, Mexican firms will in turn take advantage of the opportunity to purchase from U.S. providers the establishment of intra-corporate private networks. Increased trade in software and network consulting services is also likely, as Mexican firms become integrated into the North American business communications network. Increased demand for these high value-added services will in turn beget increased demand for the high-tech equipment that facilitates these services, thereby benefiting U.S. telecommunications equipment manufacturers as well.

The list of service providers who will benefit from Nafta is extensive. For example, companies such as AT&T, ITT and MCI International would gain improved access to a $6 billion telecommunications services market. American Express, a global financial services and travel company, sees a number of benefits to the U.S. economy from Nafta. According to the company, U.S. and Canadian financial institutions which have generally been prohibited from operating in Mexico, will be treated like their counterparts in Mexico. This will allow American Express to offer the same range of products and services to Mexican customers that are offered to U.S. customers. As the Mexican and U.S. economies grow as a result of Nafta, business and leisure travel will increase. For example, over 1.5 million Mexicans visited the United States in 1992, comprising the fifth largest tourist group to the United States. U.S. travelers to Mexico account for over three-quarters of all visitors there. As Nafta spurs travel between the United States, Canada and Mexico, travel-related services offered by American Express will also increase.

Firms providing construction and engineering services will benefit. U.S. firms have a competitive advantage over many Mexican firms due to their highly skilled staffs and advanced engineering techniques. Rising demand for services is anticipated due to Mexican infrastructure improvements, stricter enforcement of environmental laws, and potential contracts to be awarded for work on renovations and new construction for Pemex, the Mexican government-owned oil company.

The net effect of Nafta in U.S.-Mexican services trade is the removal of the variety of non-tariff barriers and burgeoning regulations restricting foreign access to the Mexican services market. The preferential access Nafta endows U.S. firms coupled with the U.S.'s highly competitive position creates an unprecedented opportunity for U.S. service providers in one of the world's fastest-growing markets. Continued Mexican growth and development plus Nafta's liberalizing effects will make Mexico a highly attractive market to U.S. services firms in the future.

This article appeared in The Exporter, May 1995.
Topic: Trade & Finance
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Many of the best markets for companies exporting through the New York/New Jersey Port Authority are located in northern Europe. Whether the goods are shipped by sea or air, the United Kingdom and Germany are top export destinations. This is fairly representative of exports departing from New York State, New Jersey, and the United States as a whole.

Western Europe's period of slow economic growth and recession has ended. Revised figures released from the European Commission in November 1994 project gross domestic product (GDP) of the European Union (EU) to have reached 2.6% in 1994, 2.9% in 1995 and 3.2% in 1996. This is up from -0.4 for 1993 and is good news for New York/New Jersey Port exporters to the EU.

Recent growth in the European Union has already had a positive effect on some U.S. exporters. Stated by Timothy Casey, Traffic Manager for J&J Log and Lumber Corp. based in Dover Plains, New York, "Our exports to the European Union have increased markedly in the past few months." He continued, "With stronger economic growth, we anticipate selling more to the region." About 85% to 90% of J&J's exports depart from the NY/NJ port.

Steve Shyne, International Traffic Manager for Pfizer, Inc., a manufacturer of pharmaceuticals and food chemicals headquartered in New York City, said that it has become difficult getting space on vessels destined for Europe. This is a pretty good indicator of the greater demand for U.S. products.

The Commission sited several factors for the EU's improved performance. These include the passage of the GATT Uruguay Round, an upswing in the U.S. economy, an anticipated decline in EU interest rates and a restoration of business and consumer confidence.

The EU accounts for 40% of the world's GDP. Germany, the largest EU economy, accounts for 24 percent of the EU's GDP. The UK, the United States' biggest European market, accounts for 16%. Per capita income for the EU is roughly $20,000. Former West Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark have the highest per capita incomes, reaching 135% of the average.

Gary Zwiercan, Vice President and Manager of the food products division of National Starch & Chemical Co., is bullish about his company's export prospects to northern Europe. The food products division of the Bridgewater, New Jersey-based manufacturer produces specialty food starches used in food processing. Stated by Zwiercan, now that the recession has ended, "We're very excited about the opportunities in northern Europe." Zwiercan pointed out that both the UK and Germany are major markets for his company.

The Single Market Has Created Opportunities — and New Risks

The European Single Market of 370 million consumers, officially established on January 1, 1993, has significant implications for U.S. companies. The elimination of many EU internal trade barriers has enabled EU-based firms to operate relatively freely, thereby achieving economies of scale and a higher degree of competitiveness. European mergers and acquisitions, and the rationalization of industrial production and distribution systems have enhanced this.

The ongoing harmonization of product standards, labeling, testing and certification requirements simplifies U.S. exporters' ability to offer products throughout the Union, while reducing costs. This also allows U.S. firms to achieve economies of scale and greater competitiveness in Europe, along with other non-EU countries and U.S. competitors, such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore.

The possibilities always exist that the European and North American trade blocs will become embroiled in trade disputes, the EU will establish protectionist measures or through trade diversion U.S. exports there are curtailed. Trade diversion occurs when members of a trade group buy more goods from each other, due to the elimination of internal trade barriers, displacing non-member goods. As a result, a sound export strategy may involve the eventual targeting of a diversity of markets on global basis.

1994 Exports to the United Kingdom — Our Top European Market — Topped $26.8 billion

The UK economic recession, which began in the third quarter of 1990 and was the UK's longest recession since the 1930s downturn, is over. During the recession, widespread business failures occurred, both blue and white collar workers became unemployed, and consumer and business confidence was undermined. And many of the jobs lost may never be replaced as enterprises adjust. The UK, however, has emerged from recession with leaner, more competitive industries.

In 1992, UK GDP expanded by 2%. It is projected by the European Commission to have reached 3.8% in 1994, to increase by 2.7% in 1995 and 2.8% in 1996.

The UK is the largest importer of U.S. products in Europe. Last year the United States ran a trade surplus with the UK of $1.8 billion, and again ranked as our fourth largest export market after Canada, Japan and Mexico. Given its size and growth potential, the UK represents an extremely important overseas market. Over the next few years, new and current U.S. exporters to the UK can expect to find exceptional trading opportunities.

UK Sectors Present Opportunities for NY/NJ Port Shippers

Britain's telecommunications sector is the most liberal among European countries and offers increasing opportunities for U.S. equipment manufacturers. Although equipment for basic voice services is largely reserved for EU companies, power utilities, transport utilities, and cable TV companies have new transmission equipment requirements that U.S. exporters can fill.

Computer software is one of the fastest growing British market sectors. After the British, U.S. companies are dominant and likely to remain unchallenged by third-country suppliers. The activities of the major U.S. vendors of computers and operating systems software have created a fertile secondary market for applications programs that require little or no adaptation to be acceptable to British users.

The UK health care market is dominated by the state-funded National Health Service (NHS). However, NHS management is becoming decentralized. As a result, Regional Health Authorities are taking on procurement responsibilities. Managerial and financial autonomy is also being granted to many hospitals and general practitioners. With increasing emphasis on cost containment, U.S. suppliers of medical equipment are likely to benefit.

A growing public awareness of environmental pollution and the return to economic growth in the UK is expected to reinvigorate the environmental technology and pollution control equipment market. U.S. advancements in this field have positioned U.S. firms at a competitive advantage.

U.S. consumer goods, especially those considered representative of the American lifestyle, are held in high esteem in the UK. The upturn in consumer spending will present greater opportunities for U.S. suppliers of children's wear and nursery products, sporting goods and exercise equipment designed for the home, garden and outdoor leisure equipment, and general fashion accessories.

Other profitable export markets include auto, electronic components and test equipment, aircraft and parts, computers and peripherals, oil and gas field machinery, hotel and restaurant equipment, biotechnology, apparel, drugs and pharmaceuticals, building products, and security and safety equipment.

U.S. Exports to Germany — the Largest European Economy — Last Year Reached $19.2 Billion

The bonanza that German unification brought to the country's western producers came to an end in early 1992. The surge in product demand in former East Germany dropped and the global economic slowdown negatively impacted the heavily export-oriented economy. In 1993 the bellwether automobile industry, for example, said to account for one in seven German jobs, hit its worst slump in years.

German GDP is projected by the European Commission to have reached 2.5% for 1994, and to increase to 3% in 1995 and 3.4% in 1996. These figures are a vast improvement over Germany's -1.2% GDP incurred in 1993. The growth and sheer economic size of the economy makes for a very profitable export market. And some observers anticipate that eastern Germany may become the fastest growing economy in Europe.

Growing German Sectors Will Benefit NY/NJ Port Exporters

The industrial process controls sector covers measurement and control instrumentation and equipment, counting and recording instruments, testing and monitoring equipment, numerical controls and programmable controllers. German growth estimates for 1995 are favorable. U.S. producers of these products have an excellent reputation in Germany and already account for a sizable portion of imports to Germany.

The majority of German computer distributors and users perceive U.S.- made computer products as of high quality and leading edge technology. The market is growing and presents sound opportunities for U.S. producers. A large number of independent software vendors with small local operations maintain about 85% of the sector. With a 22% share of the European software and services market, Germany is the largest and fastest growing European market for software.

In 1993, the United States ranked fourth among Germany's leading chemical suppliers, after France, the Netherlands and Belgium/Luxembourg. German imports of photochemical and pharmaceutical products from the United States have been strong. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the 1993 industry market size of $80.5 billion is expected to grow to $87.2 billion this year.

The German market for high quality, advanced medical equipment is exciting. U.S. producers of innovative technologies such as laser optics, new diagnostic devices, as well as new artificial implants and components should find opportunities in Germany. Innovative devices used in micro-surgery, biomedicine and radiology are also in demand.

Other major German markets where U.S. producers stand to benefit include aircraft, motor vehicles and parts, telecommunications equipment, electronic components, and audio/visual equipment.

This article appeared in VIA Magazine, a division of The New York Times, May-June 1995
Topic: Trade & Finance
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Some like it — some don't — most don't know. That's the word on the Uruguay Round Agreements (URA) signed by 117 countries in April 1994 -- but yet to be ratified by Congress. Held under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the URA will phase out quotas and reduce tariffs on most products traded globally.

GATT, the international body that governs approximately 90% of world trade, is responsible for reducing international tariffs from an average of 40% in 1947 to 5% in 1990. These tariff reductions have permitted international trade to expand enormously, national incomes to substantially increase and international competition to flourish resulting in higher quality, lower priced goods.

GATT economists believe that the URA will result in world income gains of $235 billion annually and trade gains of $755 billion annually, by 2002. For the United States it means increased exports by more efficient U.S. industries, an increase in our overall disposable income and improved economic growth. So what's not to like? It depends on your perspective -- or job.

The Agreement also means increased imports of goods for which the United States is not globally competitive and does not have a comparative advantage. On a micro scale this may result in losses for your company -- or the loss of your job. According to critics, the URA subordinates societal values to trade priorities and consequently has upset many labor unions, environmental groups, state and local officials. Additionally, many fear that the United States will surrender too much sovereignty to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the ruling body established by the URA, which is not directly accountable to the U.S. public.

"The Uruguay Round is not necessarily a good agreement for the United States," says Macfarland Cates, president of Arkwright Mills of South Carolina and past president of the American Textile Manufacturing Institute. Mr. Cates' fear that the textile industry will be hurt by the Agreement is not unfounded. According to the U.S. International Trade Commission, the URA will likely cause the U.S. textile trade deficit to increase by over 15%. The projected 5 to 15% increase in imports will offset the smaller 1 to 5% gain in exports resulting in a small but negative impact of 1% or less on production and employment in this sector.

Arkwright Mills is a manufacturer mostly of industrial textiles and garments. The company's annual sales range in the hundreds of millions of dollars, and exports account for about 15% of production. Like many U.S.-based textile mills, Arkwright mills is very competitive. Compared to other global producers, U.S. mills are one of the world’s largest and most efficient producers of textiles, being competitive in quality, innovation, marketing and related services. So why is the industry expected to lose under the URA?

The elimination of protection will expose the competitive weaknesses not of the U.S. textile industry, but of the apparel industry -- the single largest market for U.S.-produced textiles. The U.S. apparel industry is labor intensive and is subject to tremendous foreign competition from developing countries whose wages are a fraction of those in the United States. As a result, the greatest threat to the U.S. textile industry is the growth of imported garments. And increased imports of apparel negatively affect the U.S. demand for textiles. The negative effects on employment will be largely felt in North Carolina, South Carolina and to a lesser extent, Georgia. These three states account for one-half of U.S. textile employment.

Mr. Cates feels that the URA does not give U.S. producers equal access to foreign markets. Additionally, he believes that the United States is giving up too much sovereignty under the URA. Stated by Cates, "If you had reservations about the United Nations -- this is worse -- because we have no veto power."

According to Robert Stevenson, CEO of Eastman Machine Company based in New York State, "We need to produce for global markets in order to succeed. The U.S. market is peanuts compared to world markets." Mr. Stevenson, an ardent supporter of free trade, met with President Clinton last year in support of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Stated by Stevenson, "international competition is not harmful, it is a necessity. It helps you improve your product and manufacturing process."

Stevenson believes that U.S. companies must take advantage of the world economy and the GATT Agreement will help achieve this. Established in 1893, Eastman Machine Co. is a manufacturer of cloth cutting and spreading equipment used in the apparel, auto, furniture and industrial fabric industry. The company's annual sales exceed $25 million -- and 80% of new machines are exported. The success enjoyed by this company will likely improve with the advent of the URA. According to the U.S. International Trade Commission, the impact of the Agreement on the U.S. industrial machinery industry will be positive.

U.S. duties on cloth cutting and spreading equipment are about 10%. Stevenson believes that Eastman Machines' 80% share of the domestic market is not at risk with the reduction or elimination of this protection. He does see large potential export gains to countries like India, where the average current duty on his products is about 50%; and Brazil, where imports of finished machines are currently prohibited -- but will be forced open by the URA. Stated by Stevenson, "We can't support our economy by just selling to ourselves."

The world market for computers and office equipment reached $220 billion in 1993. Currently, U.S. producers supply 46% of U.S. consumption. The U.S. computer industry is globally competitive and a firm supporter of the URA. Thus, industry representatives believe that the tariff reductions will have a significant beneficial effect on the computer and office machine industry.

Dean Barren, CEO of DSB Computer Applications, provides computer consulting services and systems to customers domestically and overseas. Based in California, Dean Barren expects the growth of his small firm to accelerate with the advent of the URA. Claims Barren, "Some developing countries' high tariff barriers on computers have essentially prohibited sales by U.S. firms. For example, Brazilian tariffs range from 30 to 35% and their customs and other taxes can add an additional 40% on top of that. Some of India's tariffs on computers and office machines are 130%. Under the new GATT agreement, these barriers will come down."

According to the U.S. International Trade Commission, the URA will result in an increase of exported computer products, especially to developing countries such as India, Thailand and Indonesia. Additionally, the U.S. computer industry expects to save hundreds of millions of dollars from duty reductions in Europe.

U.S. firms lead the world in computer technology advances and invest large shares of their revenues in R&D. As a result, Barren believes that improved intellectual property protection under the URA will also benefit U.S. firms, especially in developing countries -- some of which have the fastest growing markets in the world.

The global demand for environmentally friendly products is at an all-time high. Consequently, sales are rapidly increasing for Ecostar International, a fast-growing New York State producer of biodegradable additives for plastics.

Bob Downie, CEO of Ecostar International, is very familiar with the global trading environment and a supporter of free trade. His firm exports about 70% of its production to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Denmark, Germany, Scandinavia and most recently to Mexico. Ecostar also has a joint venture production agreement in Changchun, China, located in the north. This facility produces a biodegradable agricultural mulch film which is spread over crops for the purpose of retaining heat and moisture, then degrades in the spring, not requiring the expense and labor to pick it up and discard it.

According to the U.S. International Trade Commission, the URA impact on most U.S. chemical sectors is positive, but small. Stated by Downie, "Global duties on our additives are already minimal." Thus, he believes that the URA will have little impact on his company. The only significant trade barriers to his product are logistical. Because the product is heavy, bulky and expensive to ship, the firm has plans to establish production facilities in strategic regions around the world.

Other issues, however, may be problematic. "I am very concerned about the loss of sovereignty regarding the establishment of the WTO", said Downie. "National sensitivities are definitely on the rise. People are more sensitive about their national identity and national prerogative." Overall, Bob Downie is neutral on the Agreement.

Ed Steger, CEO of Stetron International, relocated the headquarters of his electronic controls manufacturing company from Canada to the United States several years ago. The firm has manufacturing facilities in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Germany and China. Stated by Steger, the URA "was negotiated quite well. It does not appear to favor one country over another." This is an important point since the manufacturer custom designs much of its product to client specifications and ships from many countries to numerous others.

"The 90s are different than the 80s. In the 90s you have to be extremely competitive in order to stay in business. Artificial barriers will no longer keep one in the market", said Steger. "The Uruguay Round of the GATT is a good agreement. Any reduction in tariffs is beneficial -- and it should work well for the electronics industry."

The U.S. electronic component industry is the second largest in the world and a leader in the development of new product and process technologies. The industry produces a quarter of the world's total output and competes primarily with Japan, other Asian nations and the European Union. U.S. industry strengths lie in the production of advanced design-intensive electronic components, not in the commodity and labor-intensive products. Representatives of the U.S. electronic components industry support the URA. Although they sought larger tariff reductions and broader government and services agreements, they regard the URA as an opportunity to increase U.S. exports and investment.

This article appeared in World Trade Magazine, 1995
Topic: Trade & Finance
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In depicting the true costs to consumers of protectionism, Mr. Peter Sutherland, Director General of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, stated, "It is high time that governments made clear to consumers just how much they pay -- in the shops and as taxpayers -- for decisions to protect domestic industries from import competition. Virtually all protection means higher prices. And someone has to pay; either the consumer or, in the case of intermediate goods, another producer. The result is a drop in real income and an inability to buy other products and services."

Mr. Sutherland continues, "Maybe consumers would feel better about paying higher prices if they could be assured it was an effective way of maintaining employment. Unfortunately, the reality is that the cost of saving a job, in terms of higher prices and taxes, is frequently far higher than the wage paid to the workers concerned. In the end, in any case, the job often disappears as the protected companies either introduce new labor-saving technology or become less competitive. A far better approach would be to use the money to pay adjustment costs, like retraining programs and the provision of infrastructure."

In addition to higher prices, protectionism also results in a reduction of available products limiting choices.

Protectionism has severe negative implications for domestic producers as well as foreign industries. By effectively preventing foreign competitors access to a domestic market, sheltered domestic producers tend to become complacent; producing costly, poor quality products inefficiently. This principle was exemplified by the industries of Eastern European nations during the reign of Communism.

This costs of protectionism can be seen in the historic performance of the U.S. auto and steel industries, too. The United States has attempted to protect its automobile and steel industries from foreign competition through the use of voluntary restraints agreements (VRAs), a type of quota. The policies are designed to temporarily shield the U.S. industries from foreign competition thereby allowing U.S. industries to gear up or recover, and become more productive and globally competitive. The U.S. auto VRA imposed on Japan did not achieved this. Instead, the VRA effectively increased, on average, the price of Japanese autos by more than $2,000 in the U.S. market in 1984. Rather than increase market share, which was a major goal of the program, U.S. producers increased their prices by an average of $750 - $1,000. It is estimated that in 1984 this policy saved only 1,100 jobs in the auto industry at a cost to the U.S. economy $6 billion.

In 1983, it was estimated that the U.S. steel VRA program cost U.S. consumers more than $1 billion, whereby U.S. steel producers gained only $500 million. The annual costs to consumers for each job saved was estimated at $113,622. Furthermore, the price of imported steel rose 4.5%, while domestically produced steel rose almost 1%. In addition, U.S. steel exports declined.

But perhaps the most dramatic demonstrations of the costs of protectionism are those of the global agriculture, textile and apparel industries. According to the GATT report released in August 1993, the total transfers, in terms of higher prices and taxes, from consumers to producers during 1992 to pay for government support for agriculture are as follows (all totals in U.S.$):

  • Canada: $9.1b, $330
  • Japan: $74.0b, $600
  • United States: $91.1b, $360
  • EC: $155.9b, $450

Japan maintained a ban on rice imports since 1967, until its domestic shortage finally opened the door for emergency supplies in 1993. Consequently, the cost of rice, per hundred weight, can be $175 to $250 in Tokyo, compared with $45 to $50 in the United States. Partly as a consequence, Japan's per capita consumption of rice has fallen from 260 pounds a year in 1962 to 154 pounds a year in 1990.

In the Fall of 1993, Japan agreed to open its market to U.S. apples for the 1994 growing season. This is the first tangible action over the decade-long apple dispute. According to U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, the Japanese stated in a letter to the U.S. Department of Commerce that it would move expeditiously to take the necessary action to allow entry of U.S. Golden Delicious and Red Delicious apples from Washington and Oregon.

The U.S. Department of Commerce estimated in 1988 that sugar subsidies added an average of $3 billion a year to American consumers' grocery bills. In 1990, the average U.S. wholesale price for sugar was 23 cents per pound compared with the average world price of under 12 cents.

Canada, like the EC, Norway, Mexico and Finland, operates a system of supply management with respect to eggs, poultry and dairy products. In 1990, one study demonstrated that consumers in Toronto, Canada, paid substantially more for these goods than consumers in Buffalo, New York. In fact, Toronto consumers paid 42% more for a dozen eggs, 128% more for roughly the same volume of milk (.5 gallons/2 litres), 97% more for one kilogram of chicken, and 22% more for 500 grams of cheese.

The textile and apparel industry is another highly protected and supported industry regulated on a global basis by the multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA). The MFA establishes quotas on behalf of industrialized countries directed against textile and apparel exports from developing countries. The program was originally introduced to provide for an orderly adjustment to the change of international textile and apparel comparative advantage in favor of developing countries.

The U.S. has MFA quota agreements with 40 countries. The Institute for International Economics estimated that in 1986 the MFA raised textile and apparel costs by an average of 28% and 53% respectively, with annual consumer losses of $2.8 billion and $17.6 billion. The net welfare cost to the nation, after subtracting the benefits to producers and workers, exceeded $8 billion. The consumer costs to maintain each U.S. textile and apparel manufacturing job was $135,000 and $82,000, respectively. The result: the lowest 20% of U.S. households, ranked according to income, experienced a decline of 3.6% in their standard of living.

It was estimated that terminating the Multi-Fiber Agreement would increase U.S. national welfare in 1984 by $13 billion.

According to GATT report released in 1993, studies conducted during the 1980s indicate protection costs to the consumer on clothing have been estimated at between $8.5 billion to $18 billion in the United States, £500 million a year in the United Kingdom and C$780 million a year in Canada. Expressing these estimates in current 1993 dollars, the 4-person household spent an additional $200-$420 per year in the United States, $130 per year in the U.K. and $220 per year in Canada.

This article appeared in a publication of the International Society of Certified Public Accountants, November 1994
Topic: Trade & Finance
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The Mexican automobile industry has been essentially state-run since 1925. A series of auto decrees have been issued periodically in Mexico. These have effectively erected high tariffs on foreign imports of finished automobiles -- requiring foreign auto manufacturers to relocate in Mexico if they wished to sell in Mexico. Under NAFTA, the auto decrees and other trade barriers will be eliminated, positively affecting the U.S. auto industry.

With the goal of increasing the use of Mexican-made components in Mexican domestically produced models, the government issued a second decree in 1962. It increased the domestic content requirement to 60% from its previous level of 20% and mandated that power train production (a typically capital-intensive process) be undertaken only in Mexico for models intended for domestic sale. Additionally, the government prohibited all imports of finished vehicles and limited foreign ownership of parts producers to minority shares. While production more than tripled to 188,000 units annually by 1970, this was still significantly below the capacity of a solitary modern plant. While the decree did encourage the formation of a supplier base, quality was still low, and producers continued to import parts despite high tariffs. Consequently, both costs and prices were high, significantly contributing to a persistent Mexican trade deficit in the automotive sector.

In 1982, Mexican demand plummeted and capital flight ensued as a consequence of the debt crisis. Motivated by this crisis atmosphere, another auto decree was passed that further raised tariffs in order to limit imports and inhibit outflows of pesos. Led by Ford, U.S. auto makers constructed several new export-oriented engine and assembly plants that were competitive on both cost and quality with their U.S. and Canadian counterparts. Investment in maquiladora parts production also rose. By the late 1980s, the worst of the debt crisis was over and Mexican sales began to increase. The roller coaster ride of Mexican production in the 1980s saw production fall from 600,000 units in 1982 to a low of 248,000 units in 1987, but recovering to approximately 547,000 units in 1990.

The most recent auto decree was one of the few protectionist and pro-regulation pieces of legislation passed by the Salinas administration. It continued the tradition of high tariffs, limited foreign ownership, and enforcement of local content requirements. The provisions:

  1. Permitted foreign firms 100% ownership of export-oriented plants, but only 40% ownership of suppliers serving the Mexican market;
  2. Raised local content rules to 36% of the components’ value for models sold in Mexico;
  3. Required foreign assemblers to maintain a positive Mexican balance of trade;
  4. Allowed finished cars and light trucks to be imported into Mexico (beginning in 1991) for the first time in nearly thirty years, but limited market share to 20%, and required exports to positively offset imports by a ratio of 1.75 to 1 in 1994;
  5. Set tariffs for finished vehicles and parts and continued to bar imports of used vehicles; and
  6. Allowed Maquiladora plants to sell some of their output domestically.

By the end of 1993, Mexico imposed tariffs of 20% on cars, 10% on dump trucks, 20% on other trucks and buses, and 10 to 15% on auto parts. As a direct result of all Mexican trade barriers, the Mexican auto industry is highly inefficient and non-competitive. Nearly three-quarters of a century’s protection and regulation have produced an industry characterized by small and outdated plants, high costs, and low levels of productivity. In Mexico, only Ford’s Hermosillo plant and a new Nissan factory at Aguascalientes are considered world-class facilities by international industry standards.

Under Nafta, the Mexican tariff of 20% on autos were reduced to 10% upon the Agreement's implementation. This will be phased out in equal increments over the following nine years. The Mexican duty of 10% on trucks was cut in half immediately upon Nafta's implementation. This will be phased out in equal increments over the following four years. The Mexican Auto Decrees will be phased out by January 1, 2004. Thus, the pre-Nafta requirement that an auto manufacturer's exports be 200% as much as it imports will be eliminated as well.

Contrary to popular belief, U.S. assembly plants in Mexico have been primarily there to satisfy government requirements and to get around high tariffs, not to gain access to low-cost labor. Thus, according to the Office of Technology Assessment, "Mexico offers limited strategic options for the Big Three: while direct production costs are sometimes lower in Mexico, shipping costs back to the United States can eat up the savings and then some. Only for engines and labor-intensive maquila parts production do low labor costs consistently outweigh the additional costs of operating in Mexico." Consequently, investing in Mexican auto operations was the necessary price that GM, Chrysler, Ford, Nissan, and Volkswagen had to pay in order to gain access to the Mexican market -- which could be much better served by exporting from the United States. Historically, existing Mexican plants have only been profitable due to government protection -- which Nafta will remove.

Mexican-owned automotive parts suppliers' level of cost-efficiency and quality are well below the levels of their maquiladora counterparts. The protection and regulation that governs their competitive environment has prompted little incentive to invest in the upgrading of labor’s skills or the modernization of plants and equipment. Not only are they unable to export their products northward, but most of these domestic suppliers would not likely be profitable without protection. The maquiladoras, however, are much better equipped and managed, and are able to generate sufficient economies of scale in low value-added activities. According to the Office of Technology Assessment, even though such production utilizes very low levels of technology, these plants buy only about 25% of their parts content from Mexican suppliers due to poor quality. In anticipation of greater competition under Nafta, Mexican firms have begun forming strategic alliances with U.S. and European firms in order to gain access to new technologies and more advanced management methods.

The effective long-standing requirement that foreign firms produce in Mexico in order to sell there would be eliminated -- allowing much production to shift back to the United States. Thus, its no wonder that the U.S. automotive industry calls the elimination of these trade-balancing requirements "the single most significant accomplishment of the Nafta automotive negotiations." Under Nafta the terms of trade for automotive products will shift in favor of the United States, in at least the short and intermediate term.

Importantly, the rules of origin established under Nafta were devised to prevent non-Nafta countries from using Mexico as an export platform in order to secure preferential access to the United States. In order for a product to receive Nafta status or duty-free treatment, a minimum content requirements must be satisfied. Starting from a base of 50% content for most North American products, the rules of origin rise to 62.5% for autos, light trucks, engines, and transmissions, and to 60% for other vehicles and parts.

While the United States has erected some measures protecting its auto sector, they are not nearly as extensive or extreme as Mexican ones. Consequently, liberalization of its measures will be much easier than Mexico's. Prior to Nafta, the United States had a prevailing tariff of 2.5% on cars, 25% on trucks, and 3.1% on buses. Tariffs on auto parts can go as high as 6%, but usually average in the range of 3.1 to 3.7%. Buses and most auto parts imported from Mexico, however, enter the United States duty-free under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences. Products from maquiladoras entering the United States under the tariff classification 9802.00.80 only have duties levied on the non-U.S. value-added content. The United States, however, does have a significant non-tariff barrier in the form of corporate average fuel economy, or CAFE, standards imposed by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975.

Under Nafta, the U.S. nominal tariff of 2.5% on automobiles was immediately lifted upon the Agreement's implementation. The U.S. tariff of 25% on light-duty trucks was immediately reduced to 10% with a phase-out schedule of 5 years. U.S. tariffs on many automotive parts were eliminated immediately, with others being reduced to zero over a period of five to ten years. Nafta's elimination of all auto trade barriers within ten years will effectively integrate the Mexican auto sector into that of the United States and Canada, creating a truly continental auto industry.

The U.S. auto industry is currently undergoing a massive restructuring for the purpose of becoming more efficient, modern and productive. This is being pursued in order to combat higher levels of global competition, especially from Japanese companies. This restructuring process is unrelated to Nafta and will continue with or without Nafta.

According to the Office of Technology Assessment, under Nafta, in the short run some U.S. auto companies manufacturing in Mexico will likely move their plants to the United States -- since they will no longer be required to produce in Mexico in order to sell in Mexico. General Motors and Chrysler, for example, have already announced plans to close two Mexican plants in Mexico City.

According to the U.S. Trade Representative's office, the Big Three auto makers predict U.S. exports of automobiles to Mexico to increase from 1,000 cars annually to 60,000 in the first year of Nafta. And the Office of Technology Assessment projects that Mexican auto consumption could approach that of Canada's in 10 years. Although sales of U.S.-built autos are anticipated to continue long into the future, however, the number of Americans employed in the auto industry will grow to decline -- as it has done for the past fifteen years for reasons extraneous to Nafta. Thus, Nafta will only slow this process. Many U.S. parts suppliers may relocate more of their low value-added production to the Mexican maquiladoras, which will help them become more competitive.

In the intermediate to long-term, Mexico's auto industry will become more efficient as investment increases and unproductive plants are closed. While imports of automotive products from Mexican-owned firms are of no threat to the U.S., increased productivity could serve as a further incentive for U.S. manufacturers of auto parts to relegate low value-added production to the maquiladoras. By producing fewer automobile models and importing a larger number of models, which Nafta would allow them to do, Mexican producers may finally generate cost-efficient economies of scale.

Finally, a tremendous potential exists for a rapidly growing Mexican consumer market, as continued economic reforms create a middle class with significant purchasing power. As this market develops, U.S. auto makers will be well positioned to gain the greatest market share vis-à-vis European and Japanese competitors.

This article appeared in The Exporter, October 1994.
Topic: Trade & Finance
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Mexican Agriculture

The Mexican agriculture and food processing industries reflect the many contrasts of a developing country struggling to make the transition to the developed world. Surprisingly, many agricultural establishments in Mexico are efficiently run, and have achieved low levels of costs and high levels of productivity. These farms and agribusiness's in the modern sector have increased in scale and scope over time. The modern sector has drawn to a considerable extent on U.S. agritechnologies and methods, and purchases a considerable amount of U.S. farm equipment. Many of these establishments are foreign-owned and are concentrated in the northwest region of Mexico near the border. However, a large sector of Mexican agriculture is performed on a small scale by farmers producing corn and beans for local consumption, often at the subsistence level. This traditional sector is a heritage of what is known as the ejido system.

Following the Mexican Revolution, the large land holdings of the powerful aristocratic families were redistributed to the peasantry in plots known as ejidos, which average about 10 to 20 acres in size. The majority of these ejidos are concentrated in the central part of the country. Although the modern sector accounts for only a fraction of Mexico's 4.5 million farms, it produces approximately three-quarters of total Mexican agricultural output.

Only recently has the Mexican government changed its policies on agriculture. Since the Mexican Revolution, the government has heavily regulated land ownership and usage in order to prevent the reconcentration of land into large tracts, as was the case in pre-Revolution times. Consequently, Ejidos were prohibited from being sold, rented or used as collateral. Single individuals were also forbidden from owning more than 250 acres of land, and both corporations and foreigners were forbidden from owning any farmland at all. While the goal of keeping land ownership equitably distributed among the peasantry was noble in spirit, it proved to be a major hindrance to Mexico's modern industrialization.

As farming methods and technologies became more advanced in the developed world, the average Mexican farmer could not purchase them often because federal laws forbid collateralizing what was usually the farmer's only asset, his land, in order to borrow and finance investment in his farm. Additionally, the laws restricting concentration of land into large tracts prevented farmers from achieving the necessary scale economies in order to produce efficiently. Government subsidies, import licenses, tariffs, and price supports intended to aid these small farmers only exacerbated the inefficiencies in the agricultural sector while depleting public funds. The net effect of these government policies was to keep a disproportionately large number of the labor force in the agricultural sector at the expense of industry's employment needs. Today, about 26% of Mexico's labor force remains in agriculture even though agricultural output has fallen from 14% of Mexican GDP to 9% today. Such figures illustrate the low productivity of Mexican agriculture.

In an effort to eliminate these barriers, in 1992 the Salinas administration enacted a series of reforms aimed at raising productivity and reducing the imbalance in the Mexican labor market. These reforms granted farmers full title to their land, allowing them to sell or borrow against it as desired. Individuals, however, are still forbidden to own more than 250 acres (100 hectares), but corporation and foreign firms may own up to 6,200 acres (2,500 hectares). These reforms, coupled with a steady reduction in subsidies, has begun to displace farmers from marginal land which is insufficiently cultivable. Consequently, this will likely expand the more productive modern farming sector as more prosperous farmers assemble larger plots of higher quality ejido acreage. Displaced farmers will likely either be employed in the modern sector or in urban industry, where their labor will be more productively deployed. However, abolition of the ejido system is likely to result in a rise in illegal immigration into the United States. Expansion of the manufacturing and service sectors that would come from implementation of Nafta is key to Mexico absorbing the displaced agricultural workers and slowing migration to the United States.

Liberalization of foreign investment and ownership has attracted many MNC's to Mexico to set up large-scale farms or food-processing operations. Currently, Heinz, Green Giant, Kellogg's, Gerber, Del Monte, and Ralston Purina have significant investments in Mexico. These 'agro-maquilas' import significant amounts of U.S.-made equipment and materials to equip their operations. In 1990, there were approximately 50 such firms, purchasing $100 million of U.S. goods annually.

Although the reforms enacted by the Salinas administration began to correct many of the inefficiencies and imbalances in the agricultural sector, Mexico is still a small and inefficient producer of such goods. Today, at least two million peasant ejido farmers continue to grow corn and beans for their own consumption; two foods which Mexico cannot export competitively. More than two-thirds of such farmers are unable to produce enough to feed their own families. Even today, Mexico isn't able to feed itself; food imports from the U.S. tripled during the 1980s. The success of Mexico's continued economic development mandates that it construct a more efficient agricultural system. Not only are levels of worker productivity dependent on an adequate diet, but the disproportionate amount of labor working in small-scale farming operations hinders productivity growth in other more advanced sectors.

The U.S. Agricultural Sector

The United States has historically had one of the largest and most diverse agricultural sectors in the world. Large tracts of rich land, economies of scale, the world's leading agritech industry, an agricultural extension network to diffuse modern methods throughout the farming community, and quality products are all elements of one of the world's most competitive agricultural industries. Traditionally, it has generated a trade surplus with all of its trading partners, and Mexico is no different. After Japan and the former Soviet Union, Mexico buys the most agricultural products from the U.S. In 1991, the United States achieved a $15.9 billion trade surplus in agricultural products; $53 million with Mexico.

The United States and Mexico trade a great deal of farm products. Mexico is the United State's number three trading partner in agricultural goods, and the United States is Mexico's number one partner. While 75% of Mexico's agricultural exports go to the U.S., these exports represent only 12% of total U.S. agricultural imports.

Comparatively speaking, the United States holds a big lead over Mexico in the size and scope of its farming. The United States has 464 million acres of cropland versus 57 million acres in Mexico (about five times more than Mexico). Only 12% of Mexico's land is arable, whereas 20% of the U.S.'s land is. Additionally, the United States is a world leader in farming methods, fertilizer quality, equipment utilization, and genetic engineering of agricultural products. Only about 40% of Mexican land is worked using mechanized equipment, and only 30% is irrigated.

The structure of U.S.-Mexican trade in agricultural products belies each nation's comparative advantage. The largest and most regular U.S. exports to Mexico are grains, oilseeds, sugar, citrus fruits, peanuts, and meat, whereas Mexico exports fresh fruit and vegetables, coffee, and shellfish to the United States. Mexico complements some sectors of the U.S. agricultural sector and directly competes with others.

The more modern and mechanized northwest region of Mexico can produce tomatoes and other horticultural products (fruits and vegetables) more cheaply than U.S. growers, and has been exporting them during the winter months to the U.S. for decades. Because of the nature of its produce and its peak season being in winter, Mexico competes directly with Florida. Generally speaking, during winter, Mexico supplies the U.S. west coast, Florida supplies the east coast, and the two compete for the midwest market on the basis of delivered costs. However, Mexican crops come in before those in California, and fresh California produce fills the market just as the supply of Mexican produce is being depleted. Thus, the output and growing cycle of Mexican agriculture both complements and competes with U.S. agriculture depending on the specific good, the time of year, and location in the U.S. market.

Where the two countries do compete directly (mostly fruits and vegetables) both governments have used an extensive range of tariffs, standards, subsidies, and import licenses (Mexico only) to manage trade and protect powerful domestic agricultural interests. These government intrusions into trade have distorted the structure of U.S.-Mexican trade for decades, and will be eliminated under Nafta.

Agricultural Provisions and Rules of Origin

Agriculture is the only area of Nafta not covered by a comprehensive trilateral agreement. Instead, two separate bilateral agreements were negotiated between the U.S. and Mexico, and between Canada and Mexico. For U.S.-Canadian agricultural trade, the U.S.-Canada FTA remains in force, although the ongoing dispute over Canadian grain subsidies and the U.S.'s agricultural deficit with Canada will have to resolved separately. The only agricultural topics covered by Nafta are rules of origin, import-surge safeguards, and sanitary and phytosanitary standards. Trilateral obligations are established for all three areas.

Nafta establishes a timetable for tariff reduction and elimination similar to all other industries. Tariffs will be eliminated immediately on $3.1 billion, or 57%, of the value of bilateral U.S.-Mexico farm trade. After five years, this rises to 63%, then to 94% in ten years, and the remaining 6% will be eliminated after 15 years.

Products for which tariffs will be immediately lifted on U.S. exports to Mexico include cattle, beef, hides, most fresh fruits and vegetables, hops, nuts, soybeans, and nursery products for the U.S.; collectively worth $1.5 billion in U.S. exports. This represents 57% of U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico. For the second and third stages, tariffs will be eliminated on U.S. exports of selected meats and horticultural products, soybeans, wheat, rice, canned corn, peanuts, and mushrooms. This is worth $251 million in U.S. exports.

For Mexico, exports of most livestock, poultry, and eggs, as well as a broad range of out-of-season fruits and vegetables will be able to enter the U.S. duty-free on implementation of Nafta. This is valued at approximately $1.6 billion. Nafta eliminates Mexican import licenses on agricultural products, which affect an estimated 25% of U.S. exports in this category. Additionally, Nafta establishes safeguards to protect against import surges during the first ten years of the agreement.

Finally, for the most import-sensitive products, many non-tariff barriers will be converted to tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) and phased out in a ten to fifteen year framework. The most important products for which the U.S. will establish TRQs are sugar, orange juice, and peanuts. Mexico, for its part, will maintain TRQs primarily on corn and dry beans.

Agriculture is a very politically sensitive sector industry worldwide. Most nations have a variety of programs and policies affecting this sector. Mexico and the United States are no different. Consequently, Nafta contains a number of miscellaneous provisions designed to tailor the overall goals of the treaty to each nation's particular needs.

First, each Nafta partner retains the right to continue its programs of domestic farm supports under the GATT, but, according to the Nafta document, should "endeavor to work toward" measures for domestic support that do not distort trade or production. Second, both the U.S. and Mexico are committed that "it is inappropriate for a Party to provide an export subsidy for an agricultural good exported to the territory of another Party where there are no subsidized imports of that good into the territory of the other Party." Third, each nation retains the right to "adopt, maintain, or apply any sanitary or phytosanitary measure necessary" in order to protect its populace and environment. However, Nafta expressly forbids Parties to apply such measures in a manner that would "arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate" between its goods and those of a partner. To ensure that health or safety measures are not misused as barriers to trade, Nafta creates a trilateral Committee on Agricultural Trade to monitor and promote cooperation in the liberalization of agricultural trade.

Nafta's provisions on land transportation, investment, and intellectual property extend to agriculture as well. The agreement allows U.S. truckers full access to the Mexican market, which will allow U.S. agricultural goods to be delivered more quickly than the less-efficient Mexican trucking industry could. This is particularly important for highly perishable produce. With regard to investment, Nafta implements a number of measures allowing greater access and freedom for U.S. agricultural establishments to invest in Mexico.

Under the treaty, U.S. firms would be able to establish new agricultural operations, acquire existing businesses, and receive the same treatment as domestic firms. U.S. investors are also protected from expropriation, and may repatriate all their profits and capital in any currency of choice. In addition, U.S. investors are exempted from Mexican requirements to "buy Mexican," and may utilize any equipment or inputs they choose regardless of national origin. Finally, the provisions covering intellectual property rights establish rules of protection for most research. inventions, and innovations, thereby encouraging the diffusion of modern farming techniques throughout the Mexican agricultural sector.

The rules of origin for agricultural products are relatively simple compared with the complex assemblies of manufactured goods. For the most part, bulk commodities must be of 100% North American origin, and processed goods must conform to the same value-added rules of origin as manufactured goods. However, a number of special provisions regarding rules of origin are established in Nafta. For dairy products, non-North American milk or milk products may be used to make other dairy products, such as cheese, ice cream, yogurt, etc. All processed citrus products, such as reconstituted orange juice, must use 100% North American fresh citrus fruits. For coffee, cocoa, and sugar, all products must be made from 100% North American origin. The same applies to vegetable oils, stating that the crude form of vegetable oil must be of North American origin before refinement to commercial form. Finally, for trade in peanut products with Mexico, all such products must use Mexican peanuts to qualify for export under preferential treatment to Mexico.

The net goal of these special provisions is to ensure that simply reconstituting, refining, dehydrating, adding to, or otherwise processing an imported agricultural product will not qualify it for Nafta preferential treatment. In other words, goods made from processed agricultural products, such as frozen orange juice, ground coffee, chocolate, or hydrogenated vegetable oil, must use North American-originating produce. Just as in manufactured goods, simply processing an imported product will not qualify it for duty-free treatment.

Nafta's Impact on the Mexican Agricultural Sector

It is widely forecast that Nafta will have a greater effect on Mexico's agricultural sector than it will on the United States. This is not only due to the change in the structure of U.S.-Mexican trade caused by Nafta, but also to the extensive restructuring of the internal Mexican economy that both Nafta and Mexican government policy will cause.

First, Mexico's ability to produce agricultural products, for both domestic consumption as well as export, is strongly constrained by its limited resources. The amounts of arable land able to grow high yields of produce occupies less than 10% of Mexico's geographic area. The quantity of water available for irrigation is also limited because the continuing urbanization and industrialization of the Mexican economy is increasing the competition for water nationwide. Access to modern methods and equipment is also limited, due to an inadequate set of domestic institutions producing or innovating such things. A rapidly growing population also mandates that an increased proportion of domestic production will also go for domestic consumption rather than export. These collective constraints plus the United State's overwhelming advantage in meat and grain production will ensure that Mexico continues buying U.S. agricultural exports indefinitely.

Second, the restructuring of Mexico's economy means that the direction of the agriculture sector will have important implications to the national economy as a whole. In response to competitive pressures from the United States, Mexico will have little choice but to displace the many small-scale ejido farmers in favor of more modern, large-scale production. Many of these displaced farmers will likely work in the growing modern sector, but many will move to more urbanized areas to work in industry or the maquiladoras, and some will migrate to the United States. (Note that Mexico's policies with regard to the ejidos began to change in the 1980s, with restrictions on land ownership lifted in January 1992). This migration plus domestic population growth will put downward pressure on wages in both the agricultural and maquiladora sectors, and increase Mexico's dependency on imported U.S. agricultural produce. Mexican demand for food is expected to grow at a rate of 5 to 6% a year, increasing the market for U.S. exports. The net effect of Nafta predicts that small-scale producers of staples like corn and beans will lose the most, but that Mexican consumers as a whole will gain from lower food prices.

This does not mean that Mexico will be unable to compete if it modernizes and specializes. Should the Mexican government enact a set of policies that 1) encourages irrigation of all arable land, 2) shifts production to export crops of horticultural goods in place of the traditional staples of corn and beans, and 3) successfully attracts further U.S. investment for transfers in methods and technologies, Mexico could significantly improve its agricultural output and exports. If this occurred, its possible that another 2 million acres of Mexican land could be devoted to export-oriented horticultural production, increasing agricultural output by 400%. Mexico's best bet is to expand and modernize its export sector in agriculture while simultaneously maintaining growth in industry for the many displaced farmers. Mexico would then be better able to finance imports of U.S. food with exchange earned from exports of horticultural products.

The Mexican horticultural exports to the U.S. most expected to grow under Nafta include citrus juice, vegetables, grapes, melons, strawberries, and some poultry and fish. According to the U.S. International Trade Commission, however, they are predicted to grow by only minor-to-modest amounts.

Nafta's Impact on the U.S. Agricultural Sector

Although U.S. tariffs on Mexican produce will be lowered faster than Mexican tariffs on U.S. produce, the United States will continue to enjoy its lead in resources and methods over Mexico. Even under the best-case scenario detailed earlier, the 2 million high-yield acres that Mexico could possible gain is insignificant when compared to the 9 million acres under cultivation in California alone.

The only sector of U.S. agriculture expected to face any additional competition as a result of Nafta is Florida's citrus growers. Furthermore, the bulk of the harvesting jobs lost in Florida are generally held by migrant workers from Mexico and Jamaica. And citrus products are given one of the longest periods of protective transition under the Agreement. The forecast for Florida predicts that its growers will specialize, and compete on lower transportation and marketing costs. In general, the Florida agricultural sector exhibits little of the dynamism or innovation of California's produce growers. Yet, California growers, who produce more fruits and vegetables than any other state, are generally of the opinion that their state will be a net winner in agricultural trade because of several factors. These factors include the complementary growing seasons of Mexico and California, a better skilled work force able to keep advanced farm machinery operating during the critical harvest periods, better management, superior marketing and distribution, and importantly, the network formed by research organizations, universities, and the agricultural extension system. These are factors which Mexico cannot compete with in the short term, and can only begin to implement in the long term.

U.S. exports to Mexico most expected to increase in the short term include grains and oilseeds, deciduous fruit, meat, dairy products, alcoholic beverages, certain wood products, some processed fish, and certain cut flowers. In the longer term, the International Trade Commission has predicted modest-to-substantial increases in U.S. exports to Mexico of grains and oilseeds, deciduous and citrus fruits, pork and swine, beef, processed fish, alcoholic beverages, dairy products, cotton, certain cut flowers, lumber and wood products, and some sugar-containing products.

However, the most important impact of Nafta may be on the integration of Mexican agriculture into that of the United States. This will likely be accomplished primarily by U.S. direct investment in Mexico. Although Mexican laws severely restrict direct investment in actual farming and cultivation, U.S. firms already have a significant presence in the Mexican food processing industry. By 1990, 14 of the 50 largest U.S.-based food and feed processing firms had 33 affiliates in Mexico. In 1991, the sales of these affiliates to the Mexican market amounted to $4.1 billion. Many of these firms have no choice but to set up operations Mexico because the highly perishable nature of produce necessitates that firms be in close geographic proximity to their market. Naturally, these firms import U.S. equipment and technology, and their profits are repatriated to the United States.

The technology level of domestic Mexican food processing firms is quite low, and the majority of such plants resemble those found in the United States before World War II. U.S.-based processors and distributors have invested in Mexico not only on the basis of low costs, but, as previously noted, to also serve Mexico's expanding consumer market. Many of these firms have links to U.S. distributors who deliver off-season U.S. produce to the Mexican market. In the past, as this U.S. investment increased, the Mexican government implemented various programs to protect and subsidize less-efficient domestic producers. Nafta eliminates these policies, allowing U.S. firms to increase their market presence. It is widely expected that Nafta will draw further U.S. investment in both direct agriculture and processing, particularly in frozen vegetables, grain and oilseed processing, citrus and poultry processing and packaging, distilled spirits, and fish processing. Nafta will accelerate the consolidation of the Mexican farming and processing sectors, and integrate them with U.S. producers, distributors, and processors on a regional basis.

The primary effect of Nafta on Mexican and U.S. agribusiness will be the further integration of the two. Mexico's need to buy U.S. food, plus due to the U.S. superiority in both size and methods, we likely will see the establishment of a series of cross-border links between marketers, distributors, producers, truckers, and processors.

This article appeared in a publication of the International Society of Certified Public Accountants, October 1994.
Topic: Trade & Finance
Comment (0) Hits: 6113



The results are in. The North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) is working well for America. In the first half of 1994, U.S. exports to Mexico were up nearly 17% over 1993's record numbers; exports to Canada are up 10%. By comparison, on a global basis U.S. exports are projected to grow this year by 6%.

At the current rate, U.S. exports to Mexico will total almost $49 billion this year, a vast improvement over 1993. Thus, Mexico will likely replace Japan as the second largest market for U.S. goods, after Canada.

Ross Perot's "giant sucking sound" of U.S. jobs moving to Mexico hasn't materialized -- and won't. On the contrary. In this year alone, Nafta could support 100,000 new jobs in the United States. Not bad for a trade agreement.

Nafta has contributed significantly to the success that U.S. manufacturers have recently encountered in Mexico. For example, in the first five months of 1994, the U.S. automobile industry exported 12,380 passenger vehicles to Mexico, a large improvement over the 3,630 units shipped during the same period last year. In fact, Chrysler, Ford and GM are expecting to export a combined 55,000 to 60,000 cars and trucks to Mexico by the end of the year.

In the first quarter of 1994, numerous other industry exports were up considerably from the same period last year. These include:

  • Transportation equipment: Up 29.8%
  • Electrical and electronic equipment: Up 15.6%
  • Industrial machinery and computer equipment: Up 14.1%
  • Fabricated metal products: Up 31.5%
  • Rubber and plastics: Up 33.6%
  • Stone, clay and glass products: Up 34.2%
  • Printing and publishing: Up 22.9%
  • Forestry products: Up 27.9%

Manufacturing is not alone. U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico also rose tremendously. From January to June 1994, the following commodity exports showed sizable growth compared to the same period last year:

  • Corn (feed grain): Up 471%
  • Beef and veal: Up 54%
  • Pork: Up 45%
  • Poultry and poultry products: Up 28%
  • Fresh fruits: Up 78%
  • Vegetables: Up 25%

Its no surprise to see these early gains. The benefits of free trade already have been proven through a variety of pacts through out the world. In 1983, New Zealand and Australia implemented an accord liberalizing trade between them. For the three years preceding the accord, Australian exports to New Zealand grew at an average of 10% each year. After implementation, through fiscal year 1985, exports rose 18% annually. New Zealand's exports to Australia also increased as trade barriers declined.

Between 1959 - 1969, trade within the European Community, now referred to as the European Union, rose by 347%. In contrast, trade outside the bloc rose by only 130%. In this same period, U.S. global trade rose by 124%, while Canadian global trade rose by 130%.

The value of Spain’s bilateral trade with Portugal increased over 79% the first year the two joined (1986). During the first ten years of Britain’s membership in the European Community (1973 - 1983), its exports to the other member states grew by 28% per year, while its imports increased by 24%. Trade with the rest of the world during this time period went up 19% per year.

Free trade detractors cling to the false beliefs that the United States cannot compete in an increasingly competitive global economy. In an attempt to protect the United States, they suggest isolating ourselves from the rest of the world by erecting barriers to trade. They have forgotten the disastrous lessons of the past. The Smoot-Hawley Bill, signed by President Hoover on June 17, 1930, raised tariffs on imports. Our trading partners retaliated and raised their barriers on our goods. Export markets dried up. The result was a steep decline in international trade, which significantly contributed to a U.S. unemployment rate of 25% in 1930 and a severe depression.

As one becomes familiar with the global trends of the 90s, the strengths and weaknesses of the United States, and the opportunities in North America, it becomes evident that global free trade is clearly in our best interests.

The Congressional decision to ratify Nafta did not simply concern a trade agreement among the United States, Canada and Mexico. Rather, it was a decision on the direction of America, defining our perceived strengths and weaknesses, our level of confidence and courage, and a determination on how we, as a nation, will conduct ourselves in the new post-Cold War era. The world was closely watching this vote. Ratification of Nafta signaled that the United States is ready for the challenges of the Twenty-First Century. A "no" vote, however, would have been perceived as a retreat by the United States into policies of isolationism and protectionism. European and East Asian nations would have been more likely to turn inward. Most importantly, well-paying American jobs would have been lost.

A primary economic goal of the United States is to maintain a high and rising standard of living. In order to achieve this, the United States must continuously increase productivity, create high-wage jobs, successfully compete in the dynamic global economy, invest in people and in the industries of the future -- and not in the industries of the past. It's no surprise that high-technology industries dominate the list of fastest growing American industries. And it is essential that these producers have access to growing international markets. Nafta achieves this.

Industries of yesterday will perish whether or not they are insulated from international competition. Clinging to the past and its outdated methods will unequivocally lead to our demise. In order to succeed in the twenty-first century we must welcome -- not resist -- change. Nafta addresses this reality. Nafta is not part of the problem... it's part of the solution.

This article appeared in The Exporter, September 1994.
Topic: Trade & Finance
Comment (0) Hits: 3003



Industrial machinery and machine tools are highly related sectors. Industrial machinery includes farm, packaging, construction, mining, oil and gas field, textile, paper, printing, and food products machinery, as well as refrigeration and heating equipment. Machine tools includes metal-working machine tools, wood-working machine tools, and machine tools for working other hard materials, including minerals, ceramics, concrete, glass, hard rubber and hard plastic.

Mexico's need to modernize its industry has directly resulted in its demand for foreign machining and industrial equipment. Improvement in Mexico's highway system, modernizing of its ports, and the expansion of its farms and their becoming more mechanized has increased demand for construction and farming machinery. Additionally, the need for more packaged and refrigerated food in Mexico has increased as its consumer market grows.

During the period 1989 to 1991, U.S. exports of industrial machinery to Mexico rose by 71%; exports of construction machinery rose by 165%; and exports of gas and oil machinery rose by more than 85%. Also during the same period, U. S. exports of machine tools rose 14% to $185 million worth.

In 1991 Mexico became one of the fastest growing markets in the world for U.S. exports of construction and mining machinery. The United States currently supplies Mexico with more than two-thirds of its imports of farm, construction, and mining machinery, and air conditioning and refrigeration equipment. In 1991 alone, Mexican consumption of metal-working machine tools was $255 million whereas domestic production was $15 million. This huge disparity not only reflects Mexico's inability to produce such capital-intensive goods for itself, but its ardent need to import them in order to industrialize.

Selling Machine Tools in Mexico

To begin introducing machine tools in Mexico, new-to-market U.S. companies must have a service-oriented, long term commitment to the market. The traditional way to sell machine tools is through representatives and distributors. Large end-users sometimes buy directly from manufacturers.

New- to-market companies may wish to participate in trade shows, prepare brochures and promotional materials in Spanish, contact companies directly with sales agents, if possible in Spanish, join local associations and chambers of commerce, put on technical seminars to inform manufacturers about new technologies and innovations, set up a representative office in Mexico and/or establish a joint venture with a reputable Mexican firm. Financing, price, quality and delivery times are extremely important selling factors.

The demand for imports comes from manufacturers in the automotive, steel, railroad, hand tool, electric consumer goods and other industries. These industries are heavily dependent on imports of metal cutting and metal forming machine tools. The end-user market includes some 140,000 manufacturing industries and metal working shops. The majority of end-users are small metal working shops that use 15 to 20 year-old machine tools and machinery. Approximately 200 companies considered medium and large end-users have modern machine tools, often custom made outside of Mexico.

A great majority of end-users are located in Aguascalientes, Chihuahua, Celaya, Guaymas, Guadalajara, Hermosillo, Lazaro Cardenas, Leon, Mexico City, Monclova, Monterrey, Puebla, Queretaro, Saltillo, San Luis Potosi, Santiago Tianquistenco, Tampico, Toluca, and Veracruz.

Mexican importers often prefer 60 to 90 day credit terms. However, large companies that order custom-made machine tools usually pay 20% of the total value when placing the order, 30% when the machine is completed and 50% when the machine is delivered and tested. High value sales usually are made through letters of credit. Note that the supplier's reliability is a priority over price.

Mexican Tariffs and Non-Tariff Barriers

Prior to Nafta's implementation, Mexico's effective trade-weighted duties on U.S. industrial products ranged from 10.1% for textile machinery, to 15% for construction machinery, to 16.7% for refrigeration and heating equipment. According to the Petroleum Equipment Suppliers Association, U.S. companies that did not have a manufacturing facility in Mexico faced stiff obstacles in doing business there. Thus, prior to Nafta, most Mexican imported oil field machinery was assessed a duty of 20%. Mexican tariffs on U.S. machine tools averaged 13%.

For the majority of U.S. machine tool exports to Mexico, the effective rate of duty was 13%. However, for products such as the metal-working machines, most important for manufacturing operations, the effective rate of duty was 17%. The majority of machine tools subject to the higher tariffs were concentrated in a few categories of metal-cutting machine tools (horizontal lathes and certain drill presses, and numerically-controlled multistation transfer machines) and in a wide range of metal-forming machine tools (machines specifically designed for punching, stamping, bending, shearing, and pressing). These machines are extremely important for the further development of Mexican manufacturing. To illustrate, these metal-working tools accounted for 83% of U.S. exports of machine tools to Mexico in 1991. Mexico's need for such tools and equipment is essential for its continued industrialization.

Rules of Origin for Industrial Machinery and Machine Tools

North American materials used to build machinery constructed in North American will undoubtedly qualify for preferential Nafta treatment. Industrial machinery may qualify if 1) the value content is satisfied, or 2) the non-North American materials are not classified in a tariff provision that specifically provides for parts of machinery.

In general, parts of industrial equipment would qualify under the rules of origin if they are sufficiently processed in North America -- requiring a change in the tariff classification from one heading to another. Note that other requirements and exceptions apply to various parts and subassemblies. Compared with the rules or origin established in the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Nafta rules applicable to industrial machinery are similar, but more stringent with regard to value content.

For machine tools, the rules of origin are generally more stringent than the rules for other industries. Nafta preferential treatment is limited to those that contain originating parts. For example, machine tools which incorporate non-North American electric motors, pumps, electrical control panels, lasers, and major structural elements from which machine tools are built will be denied Nafta treatment. Additionally, a subassembly for a machine tool containing non-North American parts will not be considered a North American product and therefore denied preferential access to the United States, Mexico or Canada. It should be noted, however, that exceptions to the rules exist which allow goods to qualify for preferential treatment even though they do not meet Nafta's origin requirements.

Nafta's Impact on the U.S. and Mexican Industrial Machinery and Machine Tool Sectors

Under Nafta, almost all U.S. duties on Mexican imports of industrial machinery were eliminated immediately on January 1, 1994. Due to the fact that U.S. trade barriers on these goods were minimal, their removal under Nafta is expected to have little impact on U.S. imports.

Upon implementation, Nafta eliminated duties on 54% of Mexican tariff classifications on U.S. industrial machinery exports. This included eliminating duties on approximately 80% of U.S. textile, paper making, printing, and farm machinery, and 85% of food products machinery. Additionally, approximately 17 to 33% of U.S. exports of mining, oil and gas field machinery, and refrigeration and heating equipment became duty-free immediately. Mexican duties on remaining goods will be eliminating over a 10 year period.

U.S. exports of construction machinery, farm and food product's machinery, and refrigeration equipment are anticipated to accelerate under Nafta. According the U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S. exports of industrial machinery to Mexico are expected to increase by 6% in the short term and 10% in the long term.

U.S. exports of oil and gas machinery and other goods are expected to increase through Nafta-secured access to contracts awarded by Pemex, Mexico's state-owned oil company. Based on a U.S. industry source, an estimated $1 billion to $2 billion of potential contracts exists.

For machine tools, Nafta's implementation will immediately allow 76% of Mexican imports to enter duty-free. Tariffs on the remaining 24%, which is currently assessed duties up to 20%, will be phased out over a five-year period. This category is comprised mostly of the metal-cutting and metal-forming machines mentioned earlier. For the U.S. and Canada, all qualifying imports from Mexico were immediately eligible on January 1, 1994, to enter duty-free.

The U.S. International Trade Commission has forecasted that under Nafta, U.S. exports to Mexico of machine tools will rise 9% in the short term and 11% in the longer term. These estimates are considered very conservative, and likely to be higher. As a result of increased exports, U.S. employment in these sectors will rise.

This article appeared in The Exporter, September 1994.
Topic: Trade & Finance
Comment (1) Hits: 14271



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